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AN AMERICAN THEOCRACY?
JAMES MAUSt
The first amendment of the Constitution opens with "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
.... " This provision is unique among the first amendment
guarantees in that its purpose and definition can be ascer-
tained only by examining history. The free exercise of reli-
gion, and freedom of speech, press, and assembly clauses, on
the other hand, explicitly mention the values they are designed
to protect.
Although it is generally agreed upon that the establishment
clause has a unique dependence on history, there is significant
disagreement among commentators and jurists as to the his-
torical data to be used as evidence for defining it. The separa-
tionists, led by Justice Brennan, believe that history is relevant
to establishment clause exegesis because the clause is based on
a straightforward historical observation: when government of-
ficially recognizes and promotes religion, persecution and civil
war have inevitably followed. Separationists apply lessons
from history; intuitive, common sense arguments; and the leg-
islative history of the first amendment in their attempt to pro-
tect the values underlying the establishment clause. They
argue that the clause strips Congress ofjurisdiction to legislate
in matters pertaining to religion.
The nonpreferentialists, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, be-
lieve that history defines the establishment clause in the sense
that jurists, bound by jurisprudence of original intent, must
look at the legislative history of the establishment clause to de-
termine how the framer's define "establishment of religion."
Once the definition is determined, courts of review simply ap-
ply the definition to the legislation at issue. Rehnquist and his
bedfellows contend that, according to the framers, an estab-
lishment of religion occurs only when a government officially
recognizes one church or denomination to the exclusion of all
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others. Thus, they argue, government can actively promote
religion as long as no single church or denomination is desig-
nated as the official state religion. Chief Justice Rehnquist ar-
ticulated the nonpreferential thesis in his sole dissent in
Wallace v. Jaffree.t In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
Union,2 Justice Kennedy, also in dissent, proposed a similar,
though perhaps more restricted, nonpreferential view in which
three other members of the Court joined, including the Chief
Justice. Thus, it appears a growing faction of the Court be-
lieves that state and federal government can intentionally pro-
mote religion.3
Before analyzing the merits of either interpretation, it is
noteworthy to mention that the establishment clause is the
only uniquely American contribution to the republican form of
government. The significance of this fact is highlighted by ob-
serving present wars and atrocities that are committed for reli-
gious purposes in countries without some effective restraint on
government interference with religion. Indeed, it is well
known that many Americans possess United States citizenship
because their ancestors came to this country fleeing from vio-
lent religious persecution. And to this day, immigrants come
to America in search of religious liberty.
THE ISSUE
At the core of the current debate over the proper application
of the establishment clause is the concept of intentional gov-
ernment promotion of religion. Does it inevitably lead to reli-
gious persecution and strife? Or is it harmless as long as one
particular sect is not designated as the official church?
JAMES MADISON
In view of the consensus that history defines the establish-
ment clause, it should come as no surprise that the clause's
chief architect, James Madison, was a diligent student of histor-
ical political systems, including church-state entanglements.
His friend Thomas Jefferson, then living in Paris, made sure
1. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 109 S. Ct. 3086,
3134-46 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
3. With the July 20, 1990 resignation ofJustice Brennan, this faction could very
well become a majority.
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that Madison, at this time living at Montpelier, received
enough books to embark on a detailed study of ancient and
contemporary confederacies. The lessons of history-"that
last best oracle of wisdom" 4 -formed a consistent theme for
his writings, including his contributions to The Federalist Papers
and his Remonstrance and Memorial for Religious Freedom.
Through his historical studies, he likely became familiar with
Queen Mary, or "Bloody Mary," under whose reign the "fires
of Smithfield" were never extinguished during a four year pe-
riod of executing religious dissenters. Or perhaps he encoun-
tered Pope Innocent III, originator of a continent-wide Holy
Inquisition that "left a trail of mangled bodies, shattered
minds, and smoking flesh."5 In addition, the Crusades of the
Christians; the attempted extermination of the Waldenses of
Alpine Italy; the slaughter of the Huguenots in France; the
Thirty Years War between Protestants and Catholics; the suf-
fering of English Quakers at the hands of the established
church in England; and generally, the conception and use of
the cruelest forms of torture for use in defending the official
faith provide a graphic illustration of the type of world the col-
onists were anxious to flee.
Although it is not known whether Madison ever read it, the
validity of Blaise Pascal's statement is unquestioned against
this historical backdrop: "Men never do evil so completely and
cheerfully as when they do it from religious conviction."
6
Actually, Madison did not even have to look beyond the re-
cent history of the colonies to examine problematic church-
state entanglements. The Salem witch hunts, the heresy trial
of Anne Hutchinson, and the arrest of President George Wash-
ington in Connecticut for Sabbath desecration illustrated the
church-state problems which existed in New England.7
Throughout the colonies, Jews, Catholics, Free Thinkers,
and Quakers were denied the equal protection of the law and
suffered various forms of persecution.
Madison's own home state of Virginia was not without
4. Howard,James Madison and The Founding of the Republic, in JAMES MADISON ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 21, 23 (R.S. Alley ed. 1985).
5. L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 20 (1968).
6. Ervin, Colonial History and the First Amendment: A Senator's View, in JAMES
MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 215, 216 (R.S. Alley ed. 1985).
7. W. BLAKELY, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS ON FREEDOM IN RELIGION 80 (4th ed.
1949).
1990]
3
Maus: An American Theocracy?
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
problems either. The Virginia Sunday Law of 1610 provided a
death penalty for those who dishonored the Sabbath on three
occasions. In 1774, Madison communicated his disdain with
the situation in Virginia in a letter to his friend William
Bradford:
That diabolical Hell conceived principle of persecution
rages among some and to their eternal infamy the Clergy
can furnish their quota of Imps for such business. This
vexes the most of any thing whatever. There are at this time
in the adjacent county 5 or 6 well meaning in close Goal
Uail] for publishing their religious sentiments.
8
Furthermore, his famous Remonstrance, mentioned above, was
written to convince the people of Virginia to oppose a bill
which provided for the support of Christian clergy in Virginia
on a nonpreferential basis.
Regardless of the precise Colonial or European historical in-
cidents Madison studied or experienced, his observations as to
the cause of church-state problems and his proposals for cur-
ing them are clear. Government power to legislate in religious
matters opened the gates for persecution and religious wars.
9
Even ifjurisdiction was procured for the purpose of promoting
religion; abuses followed because along with a power to pro-
mote, came a power to judge the validity of opinions.'" This
general power to "intermeddle with Religion" was the reason
"[t]orrents of blood" were spilled in the old world."
Clearly, Madison did not espouse the view that the official
elevation of one sect over all others was the only type of system
in which persecution could occur. In his Remonstrance, he
stated: "Who does not see that the same authority which can
establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other religions, may
establish with the same ease any particular Sect of Christians,
in exclusion of all other Sects?"' 12 According to Madison, the
only cure was to remove religion from "the Cognizance of the
Civil Government."13
8. Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Jan. 24, 1774), reprinted in
JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 48 (R.S. Alley ed. 1985).
9. See J. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in JAMES
MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 55 (R.S. Alley ed. 1985).
10. Id. at paragraph 5.
11. Id. at paragraph 11.
12. Id. at paragraph 3.
13. See id. at paragraph 8.
[Vol. 16
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BURGER'S LEMON TEST
Almost two hundred years after Madison made his unparal-
leled contribution to religious and intellectual freedom, Chief
Justice Warren Burger set forth an analysis based directly on
Madison's observations. Burger constructed a three prong
test, generally referred to as the Lemon test, that consists of
tests applied individually in previous Supreme Court establish-
ment clause cases.' 4 A statute analyzed against this test can
not have promotion of religion or irreligion as its primary pur-
pose or effect. The underlying basis for the statute must be
secular and rational. In addition, the statute can not foster a
situation in which the church and state are entangled with each
other to the extent that one could have a coercive or oppres-
sive impact on the other. This requirement strips the govern-
ment ofjurisdiction to judge the nature of a church's activities
against its own views of orthodoxy or definition of religion. It
also prevents the historically violent results of political division
along religious lines.
NONPREFERENTIALISM
Notwithstanding the direct relationship between Burger's
Lemon test and Madison's unquestioned conclusions regarding
church-state entanglements, nonpreferentialists claim the
Lemon test has no basis in history. Briefly, these critics point to
a statement, made by Madison during the composition of the
establishment clause, indicating that the establishment clause
prevents establishment of a "national religion."' 5 From this
statement, nonpreferentialists claim that Madison merely in-
tended to prohibit the government from favoring one powerful
denomination to the exclusion of others.
This argument is fatally flawed. First, the Constitution was
drafted as a document which specifically lists thejurisdiction of
the federal government. The right to pass religious laws was
not listed among the enumerated powers. Indeed, Madison
stated in 1788: "There is not a shadow of a right in the general
government to intermeddle in religion."' 6 Since no right to
promote religion, nonpreferentially or otherwise, existed in
14. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
15. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
16. L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMER'S CONSTITUTION 176 (1988).
1990]
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the federal government, nonpreferentialists can only point to
the establishment clause as the source of governmental power
to promote religion. However, the establishment clause,
which stated "Congress shall make no law. . .," was framed to
restrict government power. Thus, as Professor Levy points
out, nonpreferentialists assert the absurd proposition that the
establishment clause added to the powers of Congress.'
7
The notion that government should take on the task of pro-
moting religion is sterile for other reasons as well. Nonprefer-
entialists contend that only statements made by "the Framers"
in the congressional debates are relevant in defining the estab-
lishment clause. Such a proposition, however, prevents jurists
from examining the actual historical events which provided im-
petus for a religious liberty guarantee in the first place. There
is literally nothing in the record of the debates that indicates a
consensus concerning the proper relationship between the
church and the state. Even the term "establishment of reli-
gion" is inherently ambiguous because colonial America was
familiar with laws which favored only one sect and laws which
could favor several sects simultaneously.' 8 Thus, nonpreferen-
tialists consider a vague and obviously incomplete legislative
committee report to be more relevant than over fifteen centu-
ries of religious conflict and terrorism. 9 The sheer illogic of
their argument seems to indicate that nonpreferentialists, in
pursuit of their narrow agenda, are attempting to sweep that
turbulent history under the rug. And understandably so, since
that history flies in the face of their thesis for at least two
reasons:
1. A government which can aid religion on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis has jurisdiction to decide which entities are valid
religions according to the majority's definition.
2. Denominations that become dependant upon govern-
ment support are placed in a position of vulnerability to
governmental coercion. 20
17. Id. at 175.
18. Id. at 174-94.
19. For example, there is no record of what was discussed in the Senate regard-
ing the establishment clause.
20. For example, Jerry Falwell's Liberty University testified in a Lynchburg, Va.,
circuit court that it would express its evangelical Christian philosophy in a more sub-
dued manner in order to protect government bonds issued on behalf of the school.
Liberty University Bond Issue Will Be Appealed Says AU, 43 CHURCH AND STATE 111 (1990).
1276 [Vol. 16
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According to Madison, jurisdiction to determine the validity
of religious truth and to coerce religious groups are the very
type of governmental powers that facilitate persecution and
oppression. Because these evils are not cured by a nonprefer-
ential approach, sectarian strife and coercion could flourish in
a government with jurisdiction to promote religion. Indeed,
Madison, regarding the bill that would provide government
funds on a nonpreferential basis to "Teachers of the Christian
Religion," stated in his Remonstrance:
It degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose
opinions in religion do not bend to those of the Legislative
authority. Distant as it may be in its present form from the
Inquisition, it differs from it only in degree. The one is the
first step, the other the last in the career of intolerance.
2'
Supreme Court Justices should be encouraged to examine all
of the writings of the colonial intellectual leaders in order to
adequately protect the values embodied in the establishment
clause. The fact that a founding father was or was not a mem-
ber of the First Continental Congress when he made a state-
ment or published a paper on church-state relations is
irrelevant. 22
Finally, the congressional debates reveal that the Framers of
the establishment clause had several opportunities to adopt
the nonpreferential view, yet they declined.
Wording which prohibited the establishment of "one reli-
gious sect or society in preference to others" was rejected, as
was a proposal which stated "Congress shall make no law es-
tablishing any particular denomination of religion in prefer-
ence to another . . . . " Why didn't the Chief Justice mention
these proposals in his Wallace dissent?
23
The arguments of Professor Levy, the legislative history of
the establishment clause, and most importantly, the lessons of
history taught by James Madison go directly against the notion
that Congress can promote religion. Thus, as a matter of con-
21. J. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments at paragraph
9, reprinted in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 55 (R.S. Alley ed. 1985).
22. Rehnquist argues that Madison's views expressed in his Remonstrance andJef-
ferson's oft-quoted statement of congressional intent are not relevant to establish-
ment clause interpretation because Madison's paper was not written for the
congressional debates and Jefferson was in France during the debates. See Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
23. See Hegstad, Views of the Wall, 81 LIBERTY 1, 13 (1986).
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stitutional law and a matter of church-state history, the non-
preferential approach should be abandoned.
THE SECULAR STATE
The enactment of the establishment clause two hundred
years ago by the first Continental Congress reflected a growing
consensus among the people of the young nation that laws
should be enacted, as Jefferson said, with "a single eye to rea-
son." 24 Reasons for favoring a secular state varied with the in-
dividual. Some, like Madison, did so from a sense of religious
conviction and scholarly study. Others favored at least a relig-
iously tolerant if not a totally secular state in order to attract
immigrants to their area to enhance commerce. George Wash-
ington and his ilk favored religious liberty for practical reasons
such as diplomacy and harmonious relations between the
states.
Whatever the reasons, the results of the experiment have
been sparkling. Politicians have been encouraged to face is-
sues head on with rational solutions, rather than retreating
into "pious pronouncements and national messianism. ' ' 25 In
addition, religious practice, thought, and debate have flour-
ished in this country with a noteworthy lack of sectarian
violence.
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
The fact that church-state disputes in this country are limited
to courtroom disputes such as government financed nativity
scenes and the purchase of nonreligious textbooks for private
school children is itself evidence that the establishment clause
has succeeded in exterminating the flames of religious strife.
Issues such as abortion rights, equal access, and government
funds for religious day care centers present current jurists and
legislators with an opportunity to set the tone for church-state
relations in the twenty-first century. Thus, the question is
raised: Will Americans maintain their unique secular state
birthright? Or will a quasi-theocracy be instituted in which the
government, rather than institutions of private choice, is given
the duty of promoting religious dogma?
24. W. MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY 9 (1985).
25. JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 15 (R.S. Alley ed. 1985).
1278 [Vol. 16
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Jefferson's statement regarding the Virginia legislature ap-
plies with equal force to the First Continental Congress that
enacted the establishment clause two hundred years ago:
In fact it is comfortable to see the standard of reason at
length erected, after so many ages during which the human
mind has been held in vassalage by kings, priests and
nobles: and it is honorable for us to have produced the first
legislature who has had the courage to declare that the rea-
son of man may be trusted with the formation of his own
opinions.
26
Hopefully, the same will be said of the lawmakers of our
generation.
26. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 16, 1786), reprinted in
JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 69 (R.S. Alley ed. 1985).
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